How the Pentagon Places SOF Soldier's Minds in Boxes

by NEWSREP · March 6, 2015

Like many organizations, the military sometimes substitutes style over substance, particularly when it concerns systemic problems in training and execution. Despite more than a decade of fighting an unconventional enemy, and an immeasurable amount of lip service paid to out-of-the-box and disruptive thinking, when the rubber meets the road, unique or innovative proposals are almost universally ignored. There are a few notable efforts to remedy this problem - the Navy’s Rapid Innovation Cell for instance, but these sorts of programs are few, far between, and highly limited in influence.
Recently Stars and Stripes, reported on Islamic State, or Daesh as it will be referred to here, using social media to wage psychological warfare against military spouses. Two years ago we, the authors, were providing Psychological Operations (PSYOP) support for a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) sized training event for light infantry and special operations, at a Combat Training Center (CTC). During our planning phase, we heeded some advice from an officer with the National Guard’s Special Operations Detachment - Africa, that if outside-the-box isn’t working, we should make the box bigger. One detachment was in-game, with teams attached to the downtrace elements of the BCT, and our element was acting as both the White Cell (friendly) support, and creating the psychological warfare injects for the Opposition Force (OPFOR), or Red Cell. Two years ago we lobbied the Special Operations Force Plans section and the OPFOR command to allow us to incorporate social media threats just like the one being reported on today, in order to prepare soldiers and their families for these sorts of attacks.

In a controlled training environment, this exposure would have given individuals and organizations the stimuli they needed in order to respond, adapt, and prepare. While our proposals were lauded, and backslaps were accompanied by, ‘we sure are glad you’re on our team’, risk aversion won the day. Nearly all of our proposals were denied, and left to languish, unused, outside of the rigid, inflexible, and far too small, box. In fact this specific concern, that the enemy would use social media messaging to influence family members, was ruled to be ‘highly unlikely’. Though, while everyone from the National Command Authority down to company commanders, have acknowledged that our current conflict is one of ideology and influence, the fact is, battlefield influence has never approached anything other than an afterthought in America’s CTC framework.

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Vandal88
It may give you some hope that in the middle of last year I attended and helped run a large-Division sized with supporting Brigades-computer based exercise that did incorporate some of these hybrid threats. Many injects consisted menial things, such as PFC Snuffy's mom was killed in a car accident and he needs to go home, however, there were several involving social media threats, not as many as I think it should have contained, but at least they pursued the concept (and I'm sure the only reason they did was b/c civilian contractors ran the exercise and it was a National Guard Division-the Guard has historically been less opposed to change than active). However, on the downside the majority of the exercise focused on "conventional" inter-state warfare between us and an enemy they want to fight, but it no longer looks like we ever will; Guerrilla threats were few and limited to sporadic ambushes of rear echelon units and right as the enemy was "defeated" in the scenario, and the division was scheduled to transition to counterinsurgency mode, they called ENDEX, depriving the Divisional and Brigade leadership of a valuable lesson that they could have been given. Something to ponder.
JohnChristopher1
On a related note: https://medium.com/war-is-boring/top-army-marksman-explains-why-gun-nuts-shoot-better-469f8dfd917f
BlackOatmeal
Today we are faster than ever but our CHANGE still comes too slow. Everybody knows we can not do what we just did the past 12 years. I believe Active Duty is an obsolete concept and nobody is in any hurry to admit it or change it. All the smart people will tell you the future of warfare requires a hybrid approach (outside the box). Therefore it would make sense that a hybrid problem should get a hybrid solution. Right before 911 we started implementing the concept of "Joint Operations" on a service wide scale (SOF got it on back at OP Eagle Claw) but it is not enough we need to pick up the pace. We are the last military generation in history to touch the Analog age. Gulf War I and before is back on the original Analog side, everyone joining up today is on the new Digital side. The rules are different in the Digital World!  In the analog world you do not have conflict until you detect it. In the digital world it is somewhat the opposite. You are always connected conflict initiates when avoidance fails. It is a battle of Authentication and verification. A big part of warfare in the future will be simply figuring out WHO is attacking. This “future” is within the next 10 years, we need to start now. They fired 1200 Captains and they want to fire 500 Majors. This totally proves my point. Nonetheless they shouldn’t have fired those guys. They should become Reservists. They did not because the Reserve Program is inflexible. It needs a total MakeOver. The new Digital military will become 2/3rds Reservists. I have 35 Years-In-Service I have been in every status I know what I’m talking about. I still have 5 more years to go to MRD. Thats another obsolete concept our MRD. That needs to be pushed up to age 65 at least. In the Digital age you’re at your prime at age 60, on the analog side you are way OVER by age 60. I’m writing a Book detailing everything and it will have a Screenplay that hopefully wakes everyone up! ... before its too late.
derekg
JohnChristopher1 The "Yes Men" of the Regiments
Waterborne
I used to think the military command(Army in my case) were just a bunch of idiots who served because they had nothing better to do. It wasnt until the end of my career that i realized it wasnt the men in charge that were fools, but rather the upper echelon command demanded they be foolish... Today I would say that the american people elect our enemies for a reason, this is the reason imo, to hamstring and make incompetent our warfighters ability to adapt to the battlefield of our enemies choosing. And it seems to be working well... But thats just political conjecture on my part, so I'll digress... I served between 93-98 in a watercraft unit. We were mostly beach assault boats and transport ships, rarely would we ever be on land, aside from being in port of course. We trained for long missions on the water, living on our boats, never going farther than eye shot from the boat... Our Primary non mission training was gas gas gas... For 5 years we trained for the Invasion of Iraq. (Yes Bush 43 decided to invade iraq 10 years before he actually did, and made sure to have the army ready for it, haha)... Anyhow, so every second of down time we had as a unit was training to be gassed by saddam. Not terrorist fast boats or pirates, not shipping lane security and anti terrorism procedures, not maritime security, not even marksmanship beyond the yearly qualifying(These things are what the unit actually did once in theater)... We trained to be gassed by saddam and nothing else... When the unit was deployed to the ME in 2002 to support the GWOT, they were well trained in being gassed, they were not well trained in all those other things they ended up doing once they got there... Those other things, they just had to learn on the job... We used to joke and say; What do we do if we survive the gas? They never trained us past that... Just a thought