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The invisible kill: Snipers and counterinsurgency warfare

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Much has been written about the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies and tactics being used in Afghanistan and Iraq—or rather not. Back in 2007-2008, during my army days in Kandahar, I remember  commanders endlessly bragging about how “we totally nail that COIN thing,” always gargling out quotes from the likes of COIN scholar David Galula. He was a French army officer who fought in the Algerian Independence War and is considered the leading COIN theoretician. He’s even cited as an inspiration to David Petraeus’ “Surge” strategy in Iraq, helping make that war a little less of a fiasco than it eventually became.

Except we weren’t. At all. This is the first in a three-part series of articles that will address serious issues about the way US, Canadian and other NATO countries conducted what they thought were COIN operations. I will suggest new approaches that, in current and future conflicts, may improve efficiency and minimize civilian deaths so that wars can no longer be, in the words of my former PSYOPS platoon commander, “about buying time.”

Part 1 : Snipers

In October 2007, a Taliban mortar team was shelling on Canadian positions near Gundhey Ghar. A reconnaissance patrol with an embedded sniper team was dispatched and they pinpointed the insurgents’ location. Carrying a .50 cal. McMillan TAC-50 rifle (designated C15 in the Canadian Forces arsenal) with a 1,970-yard effective range, the snipers requested permission to engage the enemy. Authorization for snipers had to come from the brigade, i.e. a brigadier-general. Given the caliber and 2,641-foot velocity of the weapon, taking out both insurgents and disabling the mortar tube was well within the capabilities of the sniper team, with next-to-no risk of killing or injuring civilians. Permission was nevertheless denied and a 500-pound bomb was dropped on the insurgents instead.

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Comments

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  • Avatar
    Tyler G

    "insurgents" are the locals- that about sums it up. My opinion is it's either all or nothing. What we've been doing over there is halfass war. The best war is a fast war. It would never happen like this with our correctness country and ROE's but I'd say bring it all on them. Snipers, bombs, artillery, ground troops, tanks etc. If the enemy is in your village then the village is the enemy. One or two good wipe-outs and I guarantee the locals that are truly non-combatants would be running them out and/or killing them just as quick as us if they knew having any ties would result in getting butt banged via jdam. I'm not at all for hurting civilians but for the fence straddler's you get it too. No more of the usual " Taliban make me hide weapons for them or they kill me" bullshit. The elders would say ok enough. They are fucking up our towns and our way of life if we deal with Taliban and the tribal leaders have authority to say kick rocks. Just my opinion.

  • Avatar
    Harrison C

    No COIN/armed nation-building effort has ever succeeded historically (the Marshall Plan does not count, given that the countries in question had already been heavily industrialized, modern nation-states). Galula is borderline delusional in his assessments of the French experience in Algeria; that some sections of his texts were effectively copied verbatim into the US Army's FM 3-24 is truly mind boggling. Bad inputs = bad outputs.

  • Avatar
    KEV

    That was a great article and excellent eye opener had ancestor who was in Afghanistan campaign in 19th Century bayonet and rifle. Nothing really changes expect technology still need brave men and women to fight these counter insurgency terror (old term policing action) campaigns today.

  • Avatar
    Jerry Sullivan

    Piss poor use of assets...snipers and ambushes are classic COIN operations, jets with bombs sounds like Vietnam strategy dejavu all over again. $MILLION$ a pop....

  • Avatar
    peter h

    The intractable problem is that it is not an insurgency. It is an occupation. An insurgency can be defeated when you look better to the locals than the insurgents and you are willing to out escalate. You can't win an Occupation outside of total war and total defeat. The "insurgents" ARE the locals. Dropping 500lb bombs on them only makes you more enemies. No propaganda needed.